Wednesday, March 6, 2024

Leviathan: Hobbes Summary

Leviathan (Summary) 

BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS HOBBES

 

Thomas Hobbes was born in 1588 in Westport, a village near the town of Malmesbury in Wiltshire, England. Hobbes had an older brother and a sister, and his father, an uneducated vicar, did not value education for his children. When Hobbes was a child, his father left Westport after some sort of dispute, and Hobbes spent the remainder of his childhood with his father’s brother, Francis, a successful local manufacturer. Hobbes was educated in both private and public schools, and he attended Hertford College, Oxford, where he studied logic and physics. Hobbes also studied at the University of Oxford; however, he left before completing his degree and later obtained a BA in 1608 from St. John’s College, Cambridge. After completing school, Hobbes worked as a private tutor to the future Earl of Devonshire, and he traveled Europe under the family’s employment from 1610 to 1615. After this time, Hobbes again found work as a tutor in both London and in Paris and had many prominent students, including the 3rd Earl of Devonshire and Charles II, the future King of England. Around 1640, Hobbes turned his attention to philosophy, and he circulated a pamphlet, The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, which proposed many of the ideas that would later become Leviathan. During the English Civil War (1642–1651), anti-Royalist sentiments began to rise in England, and Hobbes, a well-known Royalist, was forced to flee to Paris. During this time, Hobbes began to prolifically write philosophy, including the Latin Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio Teria de Cive (“Philosophical rudiments concerning government and society”) in 1642 and Of Liberty and Necessity in 1646. In 1651, Hobbes published Leviathan, and when he returned to London that same year after the end of the English Civil War, he was one of the most infamous intellectuals of the time. In 1660, at the end of the Interregnum, Charles II became King of England and awarded Hobbes a yearly pension of 100 pounds. In 1666, Hobbes was accused of atheism and blasphemy by the House of Commons (the lower house of Parliament) because of the ideas expressed in Leviathan, and he was banned from further publishing in England. Following this order, Hobbes took to publishing his books in Amsterdam, including English translations of Homer’s Odyssey and Iliad and a Latin translation of Leviathan. In 1679, Hobbes suffered a massive stroke after falling ill with a bladder infection, and he died soon after at 91 years old.

 

 

 

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In Leviathan, Hobbes briefly mentions the execution of King Charles I of England and the English Civil War (1642–1651), which pitted the Royalists (who supported the monarchy) against the Parliamentarians (who supported Parliament). Charles I was captured, tried, and found guilty of keeping tyrannical power over the people and was sentenced to death by beheading. After Charles I’s execution on January 30, 1649 began the period of the Interregnum, during which time England was ruled by Parliament, not the monarchy. In 1653, Oliver Cromwell (an English general who led the charge against Charles I and the Royalists) became Lord Protector, the head of state of the new British Protectorate. Under Cromwell’s rule during the Interregnum, Puritan views began to take hold in English society, which led to the suppression of Christian holidays, like Easter and Christmas. English citizens were expected to live a life of the utmost purity and piety, and forms of entertainment that were considered immoral and lewd, like gambling houses and theaters, were banned. Cromwell died in 1658, and his son, Richard, was appointed Lord Protector.

 

Richard, however, was a poor leader and politician, and the Protectorate ended in 1659. The monarchy was restored in England when Charles I’s son, Charles II, came out of exile in Europe and took back the crown in 1660.

 

Leviathan (Summary)

 

Human life is nothing but the movement of arms and legs, Hobbes argues, and any automated machine that has “artificial life” is no different. So is the case in art and in any other work created by humankind, such as in the “great LEVIATHAN,” also known as a common-wealth, or state, which is itself an “Artificiall Man.” In Leviathan, Hobbes describes the nature of a common-wealth—how a common-wealth is made and under what circumstances it is maintained or destroyed—and he also explains the “Christian common-wealth” and the “Kingdome of Darkness.”

 

Hobbes begins with the basic thoughts of humankind. Human thoughts are a “Representation” or “Appearance” of some physical body known as an “Object,” which works upon one of the human sense organs to produce different representations. The production of such appearances are collectively known as the human senses, and every human thought originates in some way from the sense organs. In short, an object places pressure on one of the human sense organs, and a message is sent to the brain via the nerves. Those messages are in turn experienced as sights, sounds, odors, tastes, and textures. Objects are in constant motion, placing constant pressure on sense organs and creating constant thoughts and appearances. “Yet still the object is one thing,” Hobbes says, “the image or fancy is another.” Aristotle considered the human senses in a different way. According to Aristotle, vision is produced by a “visible species,” and hearing is produced by an “audible species,” both of which rely on an object’s fancy, rather than the object itself.

 

 

According to Hobbes, when an object is removed, an image of the object is retained in the human mind, and this retained image is called imagination. As time passes, the images of objects begin to decay and deteriorate in a process known as memory, and multiple memories of many things is called experience. Imagination, memory, and experience each rely on and are limited by the human senses; therefore, no idea or concept can ever be infinite. Hobbes does admit that God’s power is infinite, but this only means that God’s power can never be fully comprehended by any one human being.

 

In nature, outside of civil society, all human beings are equal. Whenever two people desire the same object, they are said to be enemies, and the destruction of one’s enemy is included in their desired end. There is no common power in nature to mediate disputes, so people are generally antisocial and aggressive, and they are forced to fight for sustenance and honor. Without the establishment of a common power, people are in a constant state of war. To escape this state of war and ensure peace, people are drawn to certain agreements or rules, which Hobbes refers to as the Laws of Nature. According to the Laws of Nature, which God gave to humankind, everyone has a right to defend their life by any means necessary; however, they must also seek peace as long as peace is reasonable. The only way to ensure peace is to forfeit one’s right to violently defend their life and place that right in another through the creation of a covenant, or contract. The Laws of Nature maintain that a covenant must be honored by both parties, and a covenant can only be broken once the terms of the agreement are fulfilled or the obligation is forgiven by the person or people who desired it. There are several Laws of Nature, but each can be reduced to one simple rule: “Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done thy selfe.”

 

According to Hobbes, people “naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others,” and the Laws of Nature cannot be expected to be followed without the creation of a central power to compel people to honor their covenants. Thus, people have joined together in common-wealths. A common-wealth is any number of people living together under one unified power as determined by a covenant in which the people forfeit their right to self-preservation to single person, or an assembly of people, known as the sovereign. The purpose of the common- wealth is to protect the people, or subjects, from injury and death and to work for their highest possible contentment. The sovereign is given all the rights and power of the subjects it represents, and that power can never be forfeited or usurped. A sovereign can do no injury onto its subjects, and subjects are not permitted to accuse the sovereign of any wrongdoing, nor can they punish the sovereign for any perceived offense. The sovereign alone can judge of what is necessary for the peace and defense of the common-wealth and is responsible for passing laws and decrees.

 

There are three major kinds of commonwealths: if the sovereign power of a group of people is one person, it’s a monarchy; if the sovereign power of a group of people is a limited assembly of people, it’s an aristocracy; and if the sovereign power of a group of people is the people, it’s a democracy. A common-wealth can be only one of these three, Hobbes argues, as a sovereign power can be only one of the people, some of the people, or all of the people. A common- wealth’s power is directly proportional to number of people in it, and no one kind of common-wealth has any more power than the next. The only difference between the three kinds of common-wealths is how they wield their power. There are benefits and drawbacks to each kind of common-wealth, and no one form of government can ever be perfect; however, Hobbes argues that a monarchy is the best kind of common-wealth. It is impossible for monarchs to disagree with themselves over jealousy or self-interest, and a king or queen is only as good as the subjects they represent. Of course, Hobbes says, a monarch can relieve a subject of their money or property for any reason whatsoever, but the sovereign of an aristocracy or democracy has the very same power.

 

The sovereign has the right to appoint officers and agents to assist in the maintenance of a common-wealth, but no official can ever have more power than the sovereign. To diminish or divide the sovereign’s power violates the covenant and reverts the people back to a state of nature and inevitable war. A subject’s obligation to obey the sovereign lasts as long as the common-wealth stands. If the sovereign power of a common- wealth is captured in war and willingly transfers their power to the invading force, subjects of the common-wealth are obligated to obey the invading power as their own. However, if a sovereign power is captured in war and does not willingly transfer their power, subjects remain under the power of their sovereign and are not expected to obey the invading power. A sovereign power has the right to punish subjects if they do not follow the law, and fear of that punishment must be greater than the perceived benefit of breaking a law. The destruction of a common-wealth can come from any number of reasons but is most often the result of a sovereign who settles for less power than what they have. Power is denied through ignorance or for some benefit, but the result is always the same. To diminish or divide a sovereign’s power is fundamentally against the purpose of the common-wealth. Therefore, subjects must obey their sovereign in all things—provided that obedience does not violate God or the Laws of Nature.

 

Hobbes considers the power of the sovereign in context with the power of God. All people are subjects of “Divine Power,” even if they deny God’s existence. God’s laws and power are known to people in one of three ways: through natural reason (which is God’s gift to all humankind), by “Revelation,” or through the manifestation of a miracle. A Christian common- wealth is one in which the subjects believe in the supernatural power of God, but such a belief does not mean one must abandon their natural reason and commonsense. Christian common-wealths rely on books of holy scripture that contain “Rules of Christian life,” and in some common-wealths, these rules are even made into civil laws. While it is impossible to ascertain the authors of Holy Scripture with any certainty, the rules in such writings are nevertheless accepted as the “Word of God,” and they carry great authority within the Christian common-wealth.

 

To better understand his argument, Hobbes says it is necessary to first define the terms “body” and “spirit,” which are known in Holy Scripture as “Substances, Corporeall, and Incorporeall.” A body is something that has mass and takes up space, whereas a spirit is like a ghost and is made up of something intangible, like air. To claim a substance is incorporeal is to destroy these accepted definitions, as something cannot be incorporeal and have a body. Thus, when Holy Scripture speaks of the “Spirit of God” being in the air or within another person, this is most certainly a metaphor for faith and does not mean that some intangible part of God’s body exists in the body of another.

 

Another popular misinterpretation of Holy Scripture is the belief that God’s Kingdome exists in the present-day Christian Church. Hobbes argues that God’s Kingdome is anywhere a covenant exists between God and the people, like what existed between God and the people of Israel. God made a covenant with Adam in the Garden of Eden (which Adam did not honor), and God also made a covenant with the Israelites through Moses to become God’s “Peculiar People” on Earth. The Israelites were “Peculiar” because God was their sovereign power over and above the “Divine Power” he already claims over all of humankind. Thus, God’s Kingdome cannot truly exist again until Christ’s second coming, at which time Christ will establish his Kingdome—on Earth or in Heaven—under God’s power through a covenant with the people.

 

Until Judgement Day and the creation of God’s Kingdome, there is no central power to which all Christians are beholden, other than God and their individual sovereign power. As a sovereign’s power can never be divided or given away, it is not lawful for the sovereign of one Christian common-wealth, for example the Pope in Rome, to claim power over the Christian subjects of another common-wealth. To do so diminishes the power of the sovereign and is counterproductive to the common-wealth as a whole. It is possible to obey both God and one’s sovereign power and still be allowed entrance into God’s Kingdome, Hobbes maintains, since all that is really needed for salvation is a genuine belief in Christ. Christ’s Apostles ordered their converts to follow their earthly sovereigns in all things, even if that sovereign’s law conflicted with God’s law. In conclusion, one is obligated by God to obey their earthly sovereign until the second coming of Christ, at which time the saved will become Christ’s subjects through a covenant. The misinterpretation of Holy Scripture (which Hobbes argues is rooted in the false philosophies of Aristotle) and the desire of the Roman Catholic Church to claim unlawful authority over Christendom has thrust the common-wealth into a great “Kingdome of Darkness,” which Hobbes hopes to expose and correct through Leviathan.

 

 

 

Leviathan : Thomas Hobbes

[ This is one of the most widely read passages in the history of political philosophy, in which Hobbes explained why people in the state of nature are always in a condition of war and puts forth the only way this condition can be avoided.]

 

Of the Natural Condition of Mankind As Concerning Their Felicity and Misery

 

Nature has made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and mind; as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself.

 

And as to the faculties of the mind . . . I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. . . . That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceit of one’s own wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that *howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent or more learned; yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; for they set their own wit at hand, and other men’s at a distance. But this proves rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share.

 

From this equality of ability, arises equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only, endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to pass, that where an invader has no more to fear, than another man’s single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger of another.

 

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requires, and is generally allowed. . . .

 

Again, men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man looks that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himself: and upon all signs of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares, (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his condemn- ers, by damage; and from others, by the example.

 

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.

 

The first, makes men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.

 

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man. For WAR, consists not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time, is to be considered in the nature of war; as it is the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather, lies not in a shower or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of war, consists not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.

 

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters, no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. . . .

 

To this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body, nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every man’s, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in his reason.

 

The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggests convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature: whereof I shall speak more particularly, in the two following chapters. . . .

 

Of the First and Second Natural Laws, and of Contracts

 

. . . And because the condition of man (as has been declared in the preceding chapter) is a condition of war of everyone against everyone; in which case everyone is governed by his own reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help to him, in preserving his life against his enemies; it follows that in such a condition every man has a right to everything; even to one another’s body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of man to everything endures, there can be no security to any man (how strong or wise he is) of living out the time which nature ordinarily allows men to live. And consequently it is a precept or general rule of reason, that every man ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war. The first branch of which rule contains the first and fundamental law of nature; which is to seek peace and follow it. The second, the sum of the Right of Nature; which is, by all means we can, to defend ourselves.

 

From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavor peace, is derived this second law; that a man be willing, when others are also, as far as for peace, and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself. For as long as every man holds this right of doing anything he likes; so long are all men in the condition of war. But if other men will not lay down their right, as well as he; then there is not reason for anyone to divest himself of his: For that would be to expose himself to prey (which no man is bound to) rather than to dispose himself to peace. . . .

 

The mutual transferring of right, is that which men call CONTRACT. . . .

 

Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a Commonwealth

 The final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty and dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves (in which we see them live in commonwealths) is the foresight of their own preservation and of a more contented life; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent (as has been shown) to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and observation of those laws of nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters.

 For the laws of nature (as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others as we would be done to) of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the laws of nature (which everyone has then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely) if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. . . .

 

The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another and thereby to secure them in such a way as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is to confer all their power and strength upon one man or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or assembly of men to bear their person. . . .

 

This is more than consent or concord; it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man or to this assembly of men, on this condition that you give up the right to him and authorize all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a COMMONWEALTH, in Latin, Civitas. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that mortal God to which we owe under the immortal God our peace and defense. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he has the use of so much power and strength conferred on him, by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consists the essence of the commonwealth; which (to define it) is one person, of whose acts a great multitude by mutual covenants one with another have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defense.

 And he that carries this person, is called SOVEREIGN, and said to have sovereign power; and everyone besides, his SUBJECT.

 The attaining to this sovereign power, is by two ways. One, by natural force; as when a man makes his children submit themselves and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse; or by war subdues his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other is when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This latter may be called a political commonwealth, or commonwealth by institution; and the former a commonwealth by acquisition.

 

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