Free Will
According to
Locke freedom is not an idea belonging to volition or preferring, but to the
person having the power of doing or forbearing to do, according as the mind
shall choose or direct. We cannot say a man’s will is free, “it is as insignificant
to ask whether a man’s will be free, as to ask whether his sleep be swift or
his virtue square.” The will is one power or ability, namely, the power of an
agent to think his own actions and to prefer their doing or omission.
Freedom is another power
or ability, the power to do or forbear doing any particular action according as
he himself wills. So that when we ask, Is the will free? We are really asking, has
one power another power? which is an absurdity. It is to ask, Is the will a
substance, an agent? The will is not a faculty or substance. A man is free as
far as he has power to think or not to think, to move or not to move according
to the preference or direction of his own mind. Wherever he has not the power
to do or forbear any act according to the determination or thought of the mind,
he is not free though perhaps his act may be voluntary. It is some pressing
uneasiness that successively determines the will and sets us upon those actions
we perform. This uneasiness is desire, it is an uneasiness of the mind for want
of some absent good. God has put into men the uneasiness of hunger and thirst
and other natural desires, to move and determine their wills for the
preservation of themselves and the continuation of the species. The most pressing
uneasiness naturally determines the will. But what moves desire? Happiness
alone.
Politics
Locke’s theory
of the State is presented in his Two Treatises on
Government, the first of which is a refutation of Sir Robert Filmer’s (died 1653)
absolutistic work, Patriarchal In the second he
discusses “the true original, extent, and end of civil government.’’ He opposes
the view that all government is absolute monarchy, that kings have a divine
right to absolute power, and that mankind has no right to natural freedom and
equality. Men are naturally in a state of perfect freedom to order their
actions and dispose of their possessions as they think fit, within the bounds
of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending on the will, of any
other man. They are also in a state of equality of nature, no man having more
power and jurisdiction than another. The law of nature or reason teaches all
mankind that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in
his life, liberty, and possessions. Everyone is bound to preserve himself and
to preserve the rest of mankind when his own preservation comes not in
competition. And in a state of nature everyone has a power to punish
transgressions of that law of nature, to preserve the innocent, to restrain
offenders, and to take reparation for injuries done him. Each transgression may
be punished to that degree, and with so much severity, as will* suffice to make
it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others
from doing the like.
The state of
nature is not (as Hobbes supposed) a state of war, but a state of peace,
good-will, and mutual assistance. God made man so that convenience and
inclination drove him into society and fitted him with understanding and
language to continue and enjoy it. But many things are wanting in a state of
nature: an established, settled, known law; a known and impartial judge with
authority; power to back and support the sentence, when right, and give it due
execution. We have political or civil society whenever any number of men are so
united into one society as to quit everyone his executive power of the law of
nature, and to resign it to the public: whenever men enter into society to make
one people, one body politic, under one supreme government (contract theory).
Hence,
absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society. For if the prince holds
both the legislative and executive powers, there is no common judge who may
fairly, indifferently, and with authority decide, and no standing rule to
appeal to; the subject is the slave of one man. No one can be subjected to the
political power of another without his own consent. When any number of men
have, by consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made
that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the
will and determination of the majority. But after such a society has been
formed, every man puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society
to submit to the rule of the majority. Otherwise, there would be no compact if
he were left free and under no other ties than he was before, in the state of
nature. Unanimous consent is next to impossible. The governments of the world
that were begun in peace were made by the consent of the people.
Man gives up his freedom
and power, because the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed
to the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he, every man his
equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the
enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe and insecure. If
it were not for the viciousness and corruption of degenerate men, there would
be no need of any society but (the state of nature. The great and chief end of
men’s uniting 'into a commonwealth is for the mutual preservation of their
lives, liberties, and estates. Hence the power of society can never be supposed
to extend farther than the common good.
The first and
fundamental natural law, which is to govern
even the legislative itself, is the preservation of the society and (so far as
will consist with the public good) of every person in it. The first and
fundamental positive law of all commonwealths
is the establishing of the legislative power. This legislative is not only the
supreme power, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have
once placed it; nor can any edict of anybody else have the force and obligation
of a law, which has not the sanction from that legislative which the public has
chosen and appointed. But the legislative power cannot be absolutely arbitrary
over the lives and fortunes of the people, it is limited to the
public good of society. The laws of nature do not cease in society, they stand
as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. Hence, it has no
right to enslave, to destroy, or designedly to impoverish the subjects. Again,
the legislative cannot assume to itself power to rule by extemporary arbitrary
decrees; standing laws are needed. Further, the supreme power cannot take the
subject’s property without his consent; taxes can be levied only by consent of
the majority. Lastly, it cannot delegate the power of making laws to any other
hands.
It is not well that those who have powers of making the laws
should also have power to execute them. The federative power is the power of
war and peace, leagues, and alliances and all transactions with all persons and
communities without the commonwealth. The federative and executive powers are
almost always united, and it is best that they should be placed in one hand.
The executive has the supreme execution of the laws and should be exempt from
subordination. But the legislative may take both the executive and federative
powers out of the hands it has placed them in, when it finds cause, and to
punish any maladministration of the laws. The legislative is the supreme power,
but it is a fiduciary power to act for certain ends. So, the people have a
supreme power to remove and alter the legislative when they find it act contrary
to the trust reposed in it. But whilst the government exists, the legislative
is the supreme power. The power of choosing the legislative rests with the
people. Not the prince, as Hobbes taught, but the legislative is the soul of
the commonwealth, and the legislative represents the people; the people is the
judge whether the prince or the legislative act contrary to their trust.
Education
'Like all the great philosophers of the modern era, Locke
finds fault with the methods of instruction which had come down as a heritage
from scholasticism and presents a new program of education based on his
empirical psychology and ethics. The soul being at birth devoid of all
principles except the desire for pleasure and the power to receive impressions,
the problem of education must be to learn by experience and to realize
happiness. In order to solve it, a healthy body and sound sense-organs are
requisite; by exercise and habit the body must be hardened; hence, the need
of physical training for the child and a frugal mode of life. The individuality
of the child is to be developed in a natural manner; hence, private instruction
is preferable. Locke also emphasizes the importance of object lessons, of
learning by play, and of arousing the pupil's mental activities; study is to be
made a delight. Above all, the social end of education should not be lost sight
of the youth is to be trained as a useful member of society.
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