Jean-Jacques Rousseau
(1712-1778)
He [Rousseau] is surely the blackest and most
atrocious villain, beyond comparison, that now exists in the world; and I am
heartily ashamed of anything I ever wrote in his favor. —David Hume
Rousseau—philosopher, novelist, and composer— loved many
women and eventually became paranoid to the point of madness. He was born a
watchmaker’s son in Geneva. In his early teens he was apprenticed to an
engraver but ran away from his master. When he was about sixteen, he met
Baroness Louise de Warens, who became his patroness and later his lover. With
her he spent most of his time until he was thirty, attempting through wide
reading to remedy the deficiencies in his education. In 1742 he went to Paris
by himself to make his fortune, which he failed to do, with a new system of
musical notation he had invented. There he became a close associate of several
important literary figures of the time, including, most significantly, Denis
Diderot (editor of the Encyclopedic, the crowning jewel of
eighteenth-century rationalism). There he also met Therese Le Vasseur, an
almost illiterate servant girl, who became his common-law wife.
In 1749 Rousseau won first prize
in a contest sponsored by the Academy of Dijon for his essay on the question,
Has the progress of the sciences and art contributed to the corruption or to
the improvement of human conduct? His answer, startling to the sensibilities of
the French Enlightenment, was an attack on the corrupting effects of
civilization and instantly made him famous. A second essay, Discourse on the
Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Men (1754), which again portrayed
the evils brought to man by civilization, was also highly
controversial. Voltaire, to whom Rousseau had sent a copy
of the work, thanked him for his “new book against the human race.”
At this time Rousseau,
disillusioned with Paris, went briefly to Geneva to regain his Genevan
citizenship, but he soon returned to Paris and retired to the estate of yet
another woman, Madame d’Epinay. Always emotional, temperamental, suspicious,
and unable to maintain constant friendships, he suspected his friends—Diderot,
Mme. d’Epinay, and others—of conspiring to ruin him. He departed and became the
guest of the Duc de Luxembourg, at whose chateau he finished the novel La
Nouvelle Heloise (1761), written under the influence of his love for (yes!)
the sister-in-law of Mme. d’Epinay.
The Social Contract and his treatise on education, Emile, both published the
following year, were so offensive to ecclesiastic authorities that Rousseau had
to leave Paris. He fled to Neuchatel and then to Bern. Finally, in 1766 he
found a haven with David Hume in England. But after a year, Rousseau, who by this
time had become deeply paranoid, quarreled with Hume, who he thought was
plotting against him. In fact, Hume had been trying to procure a royal pension
for Rousseau. (Hume’s last opinion of Rousseau is stated at the beginning of
this Profile.) Rousseau now returned to France and eventually to Paris, even
though he was in danger of arrest. He was left undisturbed, however, and spent
his last years copying music, wandering about reading his Confessions
out loud, and insulting the curious throngs who came to look at him.
Still, few philosophers have had
as much impact as Rousseau on political philosophy, politics, education, or
literature.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau
According to Hobbes and Locke, people are better off in
the properly constituted state than they are or were in the “state of nature.”
Quite a different point of view was expressed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau [roo-SO]
(1712-1778), at least in his early political writings.
In the state of nature, in which
there was neither state nor civilization, people were essentially innocent,
good, happy, and healthy, maintained Rousseau in his Discourse on the Origin
and Foundation of the Inequality among Men (1754). Further, in the state of
nature, he said, people enjoyed perfect freedom. But with the advent of private
property, this all changed. “The first man who, having enclosed a piece of
ground, bethought himself of saying This is mine, and found people
simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society,” which
brought with it the destruction of natural liberty and which, “for the
advantage of a few ambitious individuals, subjected all mankind to perpetual
labor, slavery and wretchedness.”
To put this in some sort of
perspective, Rousseau wrote this indictment of civilization in 1754. This was
sixty-seven years after Newton had published his Principia. It was two
years after Benjamin Franklin, with key and kite, had proved that lightning is
electricity. Thirty years earlier, Fahrenheit had devised his thermometer. Bach
had been dead four years, and it had been twenty-three years since he had
completed the Brandenburg Concertos, a masterpiece of mathematical reasoning
expressed in music. This, in short, was the eighteenth century, the
Enlightenment, the age of light, the Age of Reason. Civilization was stuffed
with benefits. Philosophers were (as always) critical, but this
critical? Civilization a step backward? Rousseau was regarded as insane.
But Rousseau later came to think that in the proper
society people would surrender their individual liberty for a different and
more important collective liberty. Through a social compact, a people
may agree, in effect, to unite into a collective whole called “the state” or
“the sovereign,” and through the state or sovereign enact laws reflective of
the general will. An important point to be aware of here is that, for Rousseau,
the state or sovereign is an entity in its own right, a “moral person” (as
Rousseau says), a nonbiological organism that has its own life and its own
will. Rousseau’s concept of the general will—that is, the will of a politically
united people, the will of the state—is his most important contribution to
political philosophy.
If you have difficulty conceiving of a state as a person
or an organic entity, remember that Plato also viewed the state as an organism.
Or think of a football team, which can easily be regarded as something “over
and beyond” the individual players that make it up, or of a corporation, which
the law regards as a person.
The general will, according to
Rousseau, defines what is to be the common good and thus determines what is
right and wrong and should and should not be done. And the state or sovereign
(i.e., the people as a collective agent) expresses this general will by passing
laws. further, the general will, the will of the people taken collectively,
represents the true will of each person. Thus, insofar as the
individual’s actions coincide with the common will, he is acting as he “really”
wants to act—and to act as you really want to act is to be free, said Rousseau.
Compelling a person to accept the general will by obeying the laws of the state
is forcing him to be free, Rousseau wrote in a famous passage. So we may
lose individual or “natural” liberty when we unite to form a collective whole,
but we gain this new type of “civil” liberty, “the freedom to obey a law which
we prescribe for ourselves.” Thus, Rousseau wrote, “it is to law alone that men
owe justice and [civil] liberty.”
The question arises, of course:
Just how do we know what the general will is? Rousseau’s answer: If we, the
citizens, are enlightened and are not allowed to influence one another, then a
majority vote determines what the general will is.
The general will is found by counting votes. When,
therefore, the opinion which is contrary to my own prevails, this proves
neither more nor less than that I was mistaken, and that what I thought to be
the general will was not so.
Rousseau, however, distinguished between the “will of
all” and the general will. The former, Rousseau wrote, is indeed but a sum of
private wills: but remove from these same wills the pluses and minuses that
cancel each other, and then the general will remains as the sum of the
differences.
According to Rousseau, it makes
no sense to think of either delegating or dividing the general will. Therefore,
he calculated, in the state there cannot validly be a division of powers (in
contrast to what Locke thought), and though we may commission some person or
persons to administer or enforce the law, these individuals act only as our
deputies, not as our representatives.
Rousseau maintained that the
citizens of the state have the right at any time to terminate the social
contract. He also held that they have the right at any time to depose the
officials of the state. The implication of the right of the citizenry to terminate
the social contract at any time and of their right to remove officials of the
state at any time is that the citizenry have a right of revolution and a right
to resume anarchy at any time. Thus, Rousseau is thought to have provided a
philosophical justification for anarchy and revolution.
Did Rousseau also unwittingly
establish a philosophical basis for totalitarianism? Some think that is the
case because he said that “the articles of the social contract [reduce] to this
single point: the total alienation of each person, and all his rights, to the
whole community.” If the community is regarded not just as the sum total of its
members but as an entity somehow over and above the individuals in it, an
entity with its own life and will that can itself do no wrong and must always
be obeyed, then Rousseau’s words do have an ominous ring and invoke concepts
that are incorporated wholesale in the philosophy of fascism. (Hitler’s claim
that the Fuhrer instinctively knows the desires of the Volk [German for “the
people”] and is therefore due absolute obedience is an appeal to the general
will.) Also ominous is what Rousseau wrote near the end of The Social
Contract (1762): If any one, after he has publicly subscribed to these
dogmas [which dispose a person to love his duties and be a good citizen], shall
conduct himself as if he did not believe them, he is to be punished by death.
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