(106-43 BCE)
The Roman orator and statesman Marcus Tullius Cicero, of Arpinum, had a lifelong interest in philosophy and wrote a number of philosophical works during periods of forced retirement from public life. He was well acquainted with the four main Greek schools of his time and counted among his friends and teachers the Epicureans Phaedrus and Zeno, the Stoic Posidonius, the Peripatetic Staseas, the Academics Philo and Antiochus, and many others. He identified himself primarily with the Academy, though he found much to admire also in the Stoa and Lyceum.
He rejected Epicureanism. (Epicurean ideas on politics disagree with other philosophical traditions, namely the Stoic, Platonist and Aristotelian traditions. To Epicureans all our social relations are a matter of how we perceive each other, of customs and traditions. No one is inherently of higher value or meant to dominate another.)
The orator-statesman Cicero, although eclectic in his intellectual outlook and not usually thought of as a philosopher, wrote probably the most widely read of all works in political philosophy until recent times, On the Laws (De Legibus, c. 46 BCE) and On the Duties of the Citizen (De Officiis, a year or two later). The Laws was composed in deliberate imitation of Plato and was intended to complement Cicero’s De Re Publica (his Republic of a year or two before), a work that was lost until 1820.
Universalistic Theory of Natural Law
De Re Publica contains, however, the classic text for the universalistic theory of natural law as it entered into political philosophy:
True law is right reason in agreement with Nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting ... there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and one ruler, that is, God, over us all, for He is the author of this law, its promulgator and its enforcing judge.
Cicero's Doctrine of Cosmopolitan and Greek outlook
The cosmopolitan character of this doctrine—a society of all humanity ruled by one God—is in sharp contrast with the earlier Greek outlook, which assumed that only the small-scale polis could embody political good.
The individual is recognizably the unit of this universal society and is the subject of the rights conferred on all citizens, all Roman citizens, by the Roman law. The identification of law with reason must be noticed in this process; reason carries its own claims to the individual’s obedience.
The final sanction of law and authority is placed here outside the collectivity altogether, in the Deity.
Nevertheless, nothing in Stoicism could be taken as an argument against the deification of the later emperors, and one of them, Marcus Aurelius, was himself a Stoic thinker. So also was Epictetus, who began life as a slave. A rough doctrine of original freedom and equality, even the use of the contractarian model for the collectivity, has been read into Stoic texts—“All seats,” so the Stoic proverb went, “are free in the theatre, but a man has a right to the one he sits down in”—but it was religious rather than specifically social equality. Much of the intellectual groundwork, in fact, of subsequent political philosophy can be sighted in the intellectual-religious tradition of Stoicism, and it is only the philosophizing tendency of historians which has prevented its attracting more attention than it has done.
Cicero, like Polybius, operates with a basic classification of three good constitutions and three perversions of them which can be traced back to Plato's Politicus; the three good constitutions, monarchy, aristocracy and (good) democracy, go back to Pindar and to Herodotus.
Polybius and Cicero
Polybius had argued that Rome had followed his cycle through the stages of monarchy, tyranny (Tarquinius Superbus), aristocracy (tne early republic) and oligarchy (the decemvirs), but had then fortunately been able to halt the process by the establishment of a stable mixed constitution. Cicero on the other hand argues that elements of all three good constitutions were present in Rome from the beginning; one wonders whether his rejection of Polybius' scheme might not have been motivated by the apparent implication, not presumably congenial to Scipio the Younger in 129 B.C., that the next stage, if Polybius' cycle were to start again where it had left off, would be a good democracy.
Although Cicero, rejecting a fixed cycle, says that any constitution can turn into any other, the list of changes that he actually mentions in 1.65-8 is far from complete. That is hardly surprising, in that six constitutions, three good and three bad, will give thirty-six permutations in all.
However, in the accompanying diagram an attempt have been set out the changes which he actually mentions.
Three preliminary points; firstly, the changes from good and bad democracy to oligarchy are shown dotted, because it is not clear whether, in 1.6b, Cicero is referring to change from good or from bad democracy.
Secondly, the change from monarchy to tyranny, with its obvious Roman reference in Tarqulnlus Superbus, is referred to again at 2.51, and explicitly contrasted with Plato's account in his Republic of the genesis of tyranny from democracy.
And thirdly, one is struck by the disproportionate space given to description of the change from aristocracy to bad democracy - a description based upon Plato's account of the degeneration of democracy is that leads to tyranny. The change from aristocracy to bad democracy has a clear relevance to one view of the situation in 129 B.C., whatever its relevance to that of 54-53 B.C. when Cicero was writing.
Other points, too, emerge from this analysis. With a few exceptions, changes are from good to bad or from bad to good; that is natural enough, given the nature of political revolution and the rhetorical and dramatic possibilities it affords. There is no case of a bad constitution changing into its own good counterpart (a point which applies also to Aristotle’s similar analysis in Politics 5.12).
Good democracy is very much out on a limb - which may perhaps suggest that it does not play a large part in Cicero’s, or Scipio's, scheme of things at all.
Monarchy is a starting point, but no return to it is explicitly described; that is perhaps natural in the light of Roman history, and in Polybius' fixed cycle, too, the return to kingship takes place only through the complete breakdown of the state. Bad oligarchy seems to be something from which there is no escape, or no escape described. The obvious good successor to a bad oligarchy, If not the nixed constitution itself, is a good democracy; and as already suggested, good denocracy nay not he a very congenial topic for Scipio. Aristotle in Politics 5.12, by contrast, mentions both change from oligarchy to democracy (also recognised by Plato in his Republic) and change from oligarchy to tyranny.
Some of the main points of Cicero's political philosophy are:
● Cicero believed in natural law, natural equality, and the state as natural to man. He argued that true law is right reason in agreement with nature, and that it is universal, unchanging, and everlasting.
● Cicero advocated for a mixed constitution that combines the elements of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy. He thought that this would balance the liberty and authority of the citizens, and unite the people and the ruling class.
● Cicero developed a theory of private property based on natural law and social utility. He maintained that property rights are derived from the original occupation of land by individuals, but that they are also subject to the common good of the society.
● Cicero emphasized the importance of civic virtue and moral duty for the well-being of the republic. He wrote a treatise on duties (De Officiis) that outlines the principles of justice, honesty, generosity, courage, and prudence for different roles and situations.
● Cicero faced the dilemma of choosing between what is honorable and what is expedient in practical politics. He tried to reconcile his philosophical ideals with his political realities, and to defend the republic against tyranny and corruption.
Cicero, a Roman philosopher, and statesman, made significant contributions to political philosophy. Here are some main points of his political philosophy:
1. Natural Law: Cicero believed in the concept of natural law, which posits that there are fundamental moral principles inherent in human nature that should serve as the foundation for just laws and governance.
2. Mixed Constitution: He advocated for a mixed constitution, combining elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, as a means to achieve stability and balance in government.
3. Virtue and the Common Good: Cicero emphasized the importance of virtue among leaders and citizens for the common good of society. He believed that virtuous leaders would prioritize the welfare of the people over their personal interests.
4. Rule of Law: Cicero argued that societies should be governed by laws, not by the arbitrary whims of rulers. The rule of law, he believed, was essential for justice and order.
5. Political Participation: He encouraged active political participation by citizens as a way to ensure accountability and prevent tyranny. Cicero saw political engagement as a civic duty.
6. Natural Hierarchy: Cicero acknowledged the existence of natural hierarchies in society but believed that individuals should be judged based on their moral character rather than their social
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