John Stuart Mill

BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL

John Stuart Mill was the oldest of James and Harriet Mill’s nine children. James Mill was passionate about the ethical theory of utilitarianism and raised John to be the next leader of the movement. To that end, James took firm control of John’s education—Mill was secluded from other children his age (other than his siblings) and began learning classical languages when he was three years old before moving onto useful subjects such as arithmetic, science, philosophy, and politics.

Mill’s childhood was so unusual that as an adult he had a minor breakdown and began questioning whether any of his education was useful because it didn’t prepare him for a successful social life. Fortunately, John found happiness in reading poetry and was able to overcome his depression. Mill began his professional life as an administrator for the British East India Company from 1823 until 1858. When he was in his 20s, John met Harriet Taylor and quickly fell in love with her. 

Although she was already married, John and Harriet maintained a healthy platonic relationship until her husband’s death in 1849 and their marriage in 1851. Harriet played a significant role in helping John write his essays and speeches—he even credits her as something of a co-author in the beginning of On Liberty. Unfortunately, Harriet died while they were travelling in France in 1858. Heartbroken, Mill bought a house in France near where Harriet was buried and split his time between there and England. Mill served as a Member of Parliament for Westminster from 1865 to 1868 and continued writing about and sharing his ideas of liberty, utilitarianism, and women’s rights until his death in Avignon, France in 1873.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Mill was bom in the early years of the 19th century, shortly after the French and American Revolutions. In both of these historical periods, the masses revolted against tyrannical powers that limited their individual liberties and rights. Mill himself echoes many of the sentiments expressed by the Enlightenment political philosophers whose works helped inspire these revolutions, including Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Locke. In Mill's own lifetime, the American Civil War fueled debates about slavery, equality, and the power one individual should be able to exert over another. Mill himself believed that one should be allowed safely pursue one's definition of happiness as long as it doesn’t infringe upon the liberty or well-being of any other individual, which indicates his anti-slavery beliefs. During Mill’s lifetime, the East India Company and British Imperialism began dominatingthe globe through colonization and trade, introducing Mill and other English men and women to different cultures and beliefs that were presented as inferior and barbaric. Despite Mill’s antislavery views, his experience with these other cultures led him to develop the belief that "savages” (people who don't belong to “civilized” cultures) actually do need to be controlled until they develop the intelligence and ability to adequately govern themselves by Western standards. Additionally, Mill witnessed the rise of women’s suffrage in both Europe and America, although the movement didn't become widely popular until much later in his life. 

RELATED LITERARY WORKS

Mill was an adamant utilitarian, which is reflected in how he advocates for individual liberty as a means of being more useful in On Liberty. Mill’s other book Utilitarianism provides a more in-depth view of Mill’s philosophy and its major tenets. In On Liberty. Mill dwells on what the relationship between the individual and the government should be. namely that the government should play only a limited role in an individual's life. Jean-Jacques Rousseau shares similar sentiments in his Enlightenment era political essay The Social Contract. Fora contrary view—that rulers should play a strong role in the day-to-day lives of citizens—Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan advocates for an extremely powerful sovereign to strongly enforce the law in the state. Mill believes that society can be as tyrannical as the government, primarily by condemning those who don’t adhere to custom and popular opinion. In The Communist Manifesto. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels argue that a state's economic system can also be tyrannical by keeping the working classes in a position of inferiority and crippling poverty. For a more modern take on the ideal relationship between a state's government and its people. Robert Nozick’s 1974 book Anarchy. State, and Utopia, supports the idea of minimal government interference in individual lives except to punish crimes that hurt other people.

Political Thoughts 

Like Locke and Rousseau, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was much concerned with liberty. Mill, you will recall from the previous chapter, was a utilitarian. He believed that happiness not only is good but also is the good, the ultimate end of all action and desire. “Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness,” he wrote. But remember that utilitarians are not egoists, and Mill believed that it is not one’s own happiness that one should seek but instead the greatest amount of happiness altogether—that is, the general happiness.

Unlike Rousseau, Mill did not view a community, a society, a people, or a state as an organic entity separate and distinct from the sum of the people in it. When Mill said that one should seek the general happiness, he was not referring to the happiness of the community as some kind of organic whole. For Mill, the general happiness was just the total happiness of the individuals in the group.

Now, Mill, following Bentham and Hume and like Rousseau, rejected Locke’s theory that people have God-given natural rights. But he maintained that the general happiness requires that all individuals enjoy personal liberty to the fullest extent consistent with the liberties of others. “The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is . . . absolute.” Mill regarded personal liberty, including freedom of thought and speech, as essential to the general happiness. It is essential, he argued, because truth and the development of the individual’s character and abilities are essential to the general happiness, and only if there is personal liberty can truth be ascertained and each individual’s capacities developed. It therefore follows that an individual should enjoy unrestrained personal liberty up to the point where his or her activities may harm others.

Of course, it is difficult to identify when an action may be said to harm others. Liberalism places the burden of proof on the person who claims that harm to others will be done. That the burden must be so placed is Mill’s position.

The best form of government, according to Mill, is that which, among all realistic and practical alternatives, produces the greatest benefit. The form of government best suited to do this, he maintained, is representative democracy. But Mill was especially sensitive to the threat to liberty posed in democracies by the tyranny of public opinion as well as by the suppression by the majority of minority points of view. For this reason he emphasized the importance of safeguards such as proportional representation, universal suffrage, and enforcement of education by the state.

Now, promoting the general happiness would seem sometimes to justify (if not explicitly to require) restrictions on personal liberty. Zoning ordinances, antitrust laws, and motorcycle helmet laws, to take modern examples, are, arguably, restrictions of this sort. Mill recognized the dilemma that potentially confronts anyone who wishes both to promote the general happiness and to protect personal liberty. His general position is this: The government should not do anything that could be done more effectively by private individuals themselves; and even if something could be done more effectively by the government, if the government’s doing it would deprive individuals of an opportunity for development or education, the government should not do it. In short, Mill was opposed to enlarging the power of the government unnecessarily.

On Liberty : John Stuart Mill

[ The first two sentences of this famous passage state clearly what Mill intended to accomplish in his essay.]

Chapter 1. Introductory

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is selfprotection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. There are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. . . .

It is proper to state that I forgo any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those interests, I contend, authorize the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, only in respect to those actions

of each, which concern the interest of other people. If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation. There are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform; such as, to give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection; and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow creature’s life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man’s duty to do, he may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury. The latter case, it is true, requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the former. To make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is the rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evil, is comparatively speaking, the exception. . . .

But there is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person’s life and conduct which affects only himself, or, if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation. When I say only himself, I mean directly, and in the first instance: for whatever affects himself, may affect others through himself; and the objection which may be grounded on this contingency, will receive consideration in the sequel. This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness, demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and

publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not

involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.

No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.

  

On Liberty : John Stuart Mill

[ The first two sentences of this famous passage state clearly what Mill intended to accomplish in his essay.]

Chapter 1. Introductory

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is selfprotection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. There are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. . . .

It is proper to state that I forgo any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those interests, I contend, authorize the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, only in respect to those actions

of each, which concern the interest of other people. If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation. There are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform; such as, to give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection; and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow creature’s life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man’s duty to do, he may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury. The latter case, it is true, requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the former. To make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is the rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evil, is comparatively speaking, the exception. . . .

But there is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person’s life and conduct which affects only himself, or, if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation. When I say only himself, I mean directly, and in the first instance: for whatever affects himself, may affect others through himself; and the objection which may be grounded on this contingency, will receive consideration in the sequel. This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness, demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and

publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not

involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.

No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.